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ABSTRACT:
In many cases, the public (or large parts of it) want to restrict an activity or technology
that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is
thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based
on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension
requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what
is risky and what is safe. In this paper, we examine two highly influential theories of how
people form beliefs about risks: the theory that risk beliefs are errors caused by bounded
rationality and the theory that such beliefs are part and parcel of people’s core value
systems. We then discuss the implications of the psychological theories for questions
regarding liberal-democratic decision making: (1) Should policy be responsive to the prefe-
rences of citizens in the domain of risk regulation? (2) What risk-regulation policies are
legitimate? (3) How should liberal-democratic deliberation be structured?
RÉSUMÉ :
Dans de nombreux cas, le public (ou une grande partie de celui-ci) veut restreindre une
activité ou une technologie qu’il croit être dangereuse, mais que les experts scientifiques
considèrent être sécuritaire. Il y a alors une tension entre le respect des préférences des
gens et des politiques fondées sur nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques. Décider
comment élaborer une politique à la lumière de cette tension nécessite de comprendre
pourquoi les citoyens sont parfois en désaccord avec les experts à propos de ce qui est
risqué et ce qui est sûr. Dans cet article, nous examinons deux théories très influentes sur
la façon dont les gens forment des croyances sur les risques : la théorie selon laquelle les
croyances liées au risque sont des erreurs causées par la rationalité limitée et la théorie
selon laquelle ces croyances font partie intégrante des systèmes de valeurs fonda-
mentales des personnes. Nous discutons ensuite les implications des théories psycholo-
giques pour les questions touchant la prise de décision libérale-démocratique : (1) Les
politiques devraient-elles être sensibles aux préférences des citoyens dans le domaine de
la régulation des risques? (2) Quelles politiques de régulation des risques sont légitimes?
(3) Comment la délibération libérale-démocratique devrait-elle être structurée?
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is a common and immediately plausible thought that, in a liberal-democratic
state worthy of the name, the public should play a substantial role in the policy-
making process. It is an equally common and plausible thought that, in an
enlightened state worthy of the name, policy making should be based on our
best understanding of the relevant facts, which in many domains entails that
policy making should be based on scientific knowledge. But now a puzzle pres-
ents itself: What to do in cases where the public (or large parts of it) want to
restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scien-
tific experts believe to be safe (or, conversely, where the public is sanguine about
an activity or technology that experts believe to be highly risky)? How, if at all,
can liberal-democratic and enlightenment values be reconciled? And if they
cannot, how should the two conflicting sets of values be balanced?
In order to answer this question well, we need to understand why (parts of) the
public sometimes disagree with the experts on matters of risk—we need a cogni-
tive and social psychological understanding of public perceptions of risk. And
once we have such knowledge, we need to reflect on what implications the
psychological facts have for what role the public ought to play in liberal-demo-
cratic policy making. These are our two aims in this paper.
In the first part of the paper (§ 2), we will present and critically assess the
evidence for two major and influential psychological theories of risk percep-
tion. One is the bounded rationality theory, according to which (nonexperts’)
thinking about risk is dominated by the use of fast heuristics that lead to
predictable biases in risk perception. The other is the cultural cognition theory,
which says that lay beliefs about many risks are a result of culturally (or ideo-
logically) biased processing of evidence, and hence are strongly correlated with
cultural (or ideological) worldviews. We will argue that, although both theories
have their merits, cultural cognition seems to be at play in a majority of the cases
where questions of risk regulation are salient politically.
In the second part of the paper (§ 3), we will examine the implications of the
psychological theories for three influential liberal-democratic ideas: (3.1) that
public policy should be responsive to the preferences of citizens; (3.2) that
liberal-democratic legitimacy requires that policies are reasonably acceptable
for all those subject to them; and (3.3) that the public should directly participate
in policy making through public deliberation. We will focus on claims made by
proponents of each of the psychological theories discussed concerning such
implications. In particular, we will engage the views of Cass R. Sunstein, on the
side of the bounded rationality theory (Sunstein, 2002; 2005; 2006), and of Dan
M. Kahan, with a number of coauthors, on the side of the cultural cognition
theory (Kahan, 2007; Kahan & Slovic, 2006; Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil,
2006).
On Sunstein’s view, the fact that public risk perceptions exhibit the biases char-
acteristic of bounded rationality means that they should be disregarded, and that
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policy should instead be determined by the experts using cost-benefit analysis.
We will argue that, although Sunstein is right to point out that bounded ration-
ality undermines the case for being responsive to public preferences for risk
regulation, his alternative has its own problems.
According to Kahan and coauthors, the fact that risk perceptions are expressions
of cultural or ideological worldviews means that they should be treated much as
values are treated in liberal-democratic theory. We will argue that this is largely
false. However, cultural cognition theory does contain important insights into
how we can overcome the conflict between respecting people’s values and
respecting the truth when making policy concerning risk.
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RISK PERCEPTION
Risk perception research has made it clear that there are a number of domains
where a substantial proportion of the public disagree with experts about risk-
relevant facts. Genetically modified (GM) foods and global warming are two
illustrative examples: according to a report by Pew (Pew Research Center 2015),
37% of US adults agree that it is safe to eat GM foods, while the corresponding
number among AAAS scientists is 88%. 50% of US adults and 87% of AAAS
scientists agree that global warming as a result of human activity is occurring,
the latter number increasing to 97% among authors of peer-reviewed articles in
climate science (Cook et al. 2013).
The psychology of risk perception aims at explaining such deviations by refer-
ence to features of human cognition. The field has been strongly influenced by
seminal work by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on cognitive heuristics
and their resulting biases on probability assessments and decision making, as
well as their work on prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Tversky &
Kahneman 1981; Kahneman 2011). A heuristic is a relatively simple cognitive
mechanism that delivers a rapid answer to what may be a complex question,
saving time and cognitive resources. While often accurate, the outputs of heuris-
tics may systematically fail under some circumstances. It is these failures that are
denoted as biases. So ‘heuristic’ refers to a cognitive mechanism while ‘bias’
expresses a normative assessment of the output of this mechanism, to the effect
that something has gone wrong from the point of view of a certain normative
theory of reasoning (usually probability theory or logic).
To provide an illustrative example: one of the most well-studied heuristics that
is also highly relevant to risk perception is the availability heuristic. When using
the availability heuristic to answer a question about the probability of an event,
people rely on the ease with which they can recall or imagine instances of such
events (Tversky & Kahneman 1974).While this may usually yield an acceptably
accurate estimate, reliance on the availability heuristic leads to systematic biases
in the assessment of probability. The probability of highly salient or widely
publicized risks, such as tornadoes or homicides, tends to be overestimated,
while the probability of less salient risks, such as heart disease or diabetes, tend
to be underestimated (Folkes 1988; Lichtenstein et al. 1978).
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Another heuristic whose more recent discovery had a profound impact on the
psychology of risk perception is the affect heuristic (Slovic et al. 2004; Finucane
et al. 2000). The affect heuristic denotes a tendency for people’s judgments of
risks and benefits to align along uniformly positive or negative affect towards the
risk source. If someone believes that a technology or activity is high risk, she is
also likely to believe that its benefits will be low, and vice versa, although there
is little reason to suspect that such an inverse correlation usually obtains in real-
ity. This goes beyond people starting with a positive or negative feeling toward
a risk source and then generating beliefs about risk and benefits on that
emotional background: simply providing people who are naïve with respect to
some technology with information that it is high (or low) risk (or benefit) will
tend by itself to generate affect, and therefore a belief about benefit (risk) that
matches the valence of the initial information. So, if I inform you that a tech-
nology, which you currently have no opinion of, is highly risky, this alone will
tend to cause you to form the belief that the technology carries little benefit,
even in the absence of any direct information about its benefit. More generally,
the affect heuristic is representative of an increased awareness within cognitive
psychology of the important role emotion plays in risk perception (Roeser, 2010;
Slovic et al. 2004).
Heuristic or emotional information processing is typically cast within a dual
process framework where it is contrasted with more deliberate, analytical reason-
ing (Evans 2008; Reyna 2004). When someone is thinking about a technology
or activity, a heuristic may yield an initial verdict about risk. Depending on moti-
vation and ability, deliberate reasoning may then be used to scrutinize and possi-
bly override this initial verdict with one that is the result of more deliberate
processing (Evans & Stanovich 2013). Heuristics that yield strong intuitions or
powerful emotional responses are naturally less likely to be overridden.
2.1. Bounded rationality theory
Psychologists are largely in agreement about the above core findings. Never-
theless, there is substantial disagreement about deeper theories of the psychol-
ogy of risk perception. We first present bounded rationality theory. The term
‘bounded rationality’ is sometimes used simply to denote that we as humans are
subject to limitations in our decision-making apparatus, compared to an ideally
rational agent. This is not controversial. What we call bounded rationality theory
is a more specific series of claims. It holds that our cognitive apparatus aims at
providing accurate factual beliefs, but is fallible in achieving this aim because
of overreliance on heuristics. When we form a belief about some risk-relevant
fact, the function of that belief is to accurately represent some state of affairs to
help us make better choices. However, beliefs may fail to fulfil this function
because of cognitive limitations. Subjects may lack the time or processing capac-
ity to engage in deliberate reasoning, and therefore rely on heuristics; and since
heuristics are vulnerable to biases, our beliefs may be mistaken. These mistakes
can be characterized as “blunders” (Sunstein, 2005): they stem from
one’s acceptance of the output of heuristic processing and failure to engage in
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sufficient reasoning. When lay people disagree with experts about risk, the
reason, according to bounded rationality theory, is that lay people often blunder.1
They rely on heuristic processing, with their associated biases, in their assess-
ment of risk, whereas experts tend to rely on deliberate reasoning including the
scientific method and cost-benefit analysis.
Bounded rationality theory has a wealth of research to support it. It rests largely
on the literature on core heuristics such as availability, the affect heuristic, fram-
ing, and anchoring—which is extensive and well replicated (Klein et al. 2014;
Shafir & Leboeuf 2002; Kahneman 2013; Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Addi-
tionally, there is some support to the claim that many mistaken beliefs and bad
decisions stem from heuristic processing and that increased deliberate process-
ing tends to predict more accurate beliefs and better decisions. One line of
research to provide this support is based on individual differences in rational
thought (Stanovich & West 1998). People who score highly in one type of test
of deliberate reasoning tend to score highly in others (Stanovich & West 2014),
and often make better decisions. For example, they tend to make choices under
uncertainty that are more utility maximizing compared to people who score low
(Frederick 2005). Another approach is to experimentally impair deliberate
reasoning through time pressure or a concurrent cognitive load task, or
conversely to force a time delay or otherwise attempt to promote reasoning.
Inhibiting reasoning consistently leads to errors and to more impulsive behav-
iour and risk aversion, while bolstering reasoning at least sometimes has the
opposite effect (Benjamin et al. 2013).
An aspect of bounded rationality theory that will be important going forward is
the implication that people would recognize many of their beliefs as erroneous
if they were to engage in the deliberation required to correct their blunder. This
hypothetical change of belief might then give rise to different assessments of
risk, which would, by virtue of their increased accuracy, be better able to further
people’s own interests. Thus, adherents of bounded rationality theory can
provide a justification for a policy that ignores people’s actual beliefs by point-
ing out that, in addition to better serving their interests, the policy also respects
the belief that people actually would have if they were to consider the issue more
carefully.
Thus, if the bounded rationality explanation is correct, then we should expect
that those parts of the population who disagree with expert judgment about risk-
relevant facts do so in part because of a lack of cognitive resources. There are
certainly cases where this is borne out. For example, people who tend to rely on
intuitive processing profess greater belief in the efficacy of truly ineffectual treat-
ments such as homeopathy to cure disease (Lindeman 2011). However, ques-
tioning the general truth of this prediction is at the heart of the cultural cognition
critique of bounded rationality, to which we turn in the next section.
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2.2. Cultural cognition theory
As mentioned, there is very little disagreement that humans do rely on heuris-
tics and display biases in their thinking about risk.2 However, the notion that
mistaken factual beliefs as a rule are due to the operation of heuristics has come
under strong empirical attack from cultural cognition theory. Cultural cognition
theory has its roots in anthropological work that describes societal conflict over
risk as structured along two cultural dimensions (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983).
One dimension, individualism-communitarianism, classifies people according
to the extent to which they prefer collective solutions to societal problems over
individual and market-driven solutions. The other, egalitarianism-hierarchy,
describes the extent to which one prefers firmly stratified social orderings in
roles and authority. These two dimensions combine into cultural worldviews,
which to a large extent determine people’s perception of various risk factors
depending on their congeniality or lack thereof to the worldview in question.
For example, hierarchical individualists will tend to view regulation aimed at
industry as questioning the competence of societal elites and the ability of market
forces to solve problems, and therefore tend to view the activity of industry as
low risk and not requiring such regulation.
This helps explain a feature of risk perception that is hard to make sense of from
within a purely bounded-rationality framework: namely, that attitudes toward
many risks form coherent clusters that are sharply divided along political and
social fault lines. The above-mentioned figure of 50% of US adults affirming the
reality of anthropogenic global warming hides a sharp division within the coun-
try: the number is only 15% among conservative republicans, but 79% among
liberal democrats (Pew Research Center 2016). Likewise, if one denies the real-
ity of global warming, one is also likely to profess the safety of nuclear power
and to favour less gun control. One suggestion from bounded rationality theory
might be that this shows one part of the population to be generally more disposed
to rely on heuristics than the other. But one would then expect that this group
would consistently hold beliefs that are contrary to scientific experts, which is
not the case (e.g., as regards the safety of nuclear energy, Pew Research Center,
2015).
To the anthropological base, cultural-cognition theory adds work from psychol-
ogy on confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and identity-protective cognition,
all of which describe how humans may be biased in their search for, and evalu-
ation of, evidence (Nickerson 1998; Kunda 1990; Dawson et al. 2002). Humans
tend to seek out and evaluate evidence in ways that are congenial to their
believed or desired conclusions. We tend to accept evidence in favour of our
favoured belief with little scrutiny. If the output of a heuristic bolsters a favoured
position, then we are unlikely to engage deliberate reasoning to check and possi-
bly overwrite this response. On the other hand, evidence against favoured beliefs
is heavily scrutinized and subsequently tends to be deemed weak, while heuris-
tic responses that run counter to a favoured belief will tend to activate deliber-
ate reasoning in an attempt to find an alternative response (Taber & Lodge 2006;
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Dawson et al. 2002; Kahan et al. 2017). In evidence-search situations, where
people are given the choice between viewing evidence that supports or discon-
firms their favoured view, subjects tend to select supporting evidence (Jones &
Sugden, 2001; Taber & Lodge, 2006).
So, according to cultural cognition theory, cultural worldviews, not costs and
benefits, to a large extent determine people’s basic attitudes toward various risk
sources. These worldviews furnish us with our basic values, which in turn cause
us to engage in motivated reasoning in dealing with evidence, with the aim of
reaching factual beliefs about these risk sources that protect and bolster the atti-
tude in line with our values.
This suggests a flaw in the bounded-rationality picture. Mechanisms such as
motivated reasoning and identity-protective cognition are not heuristics. They
are instances of deliberate reasoning, but instances where the aim appears not to
be merely a correct appreciation of the facts, but rather to provide support for a
particular conclusion. When cultural worldviews are in play during evaluation
of evidence regarding a risk source, we are likely to use our reasoning to assess
the evidence such that it comes out supporting the position that confirms our
worldview. This in turn predicts that widespread increased reliance on reason-
ing rather than heuristics will not necessarily bring about convergence towards
a view closer to the truth. Rather, we should expect those with the greatest
propensity and ability to engage in deliberate processing to be best at making the
evidence yield their favoured conclusion (Kahan 2013).
In an illustrative study (Kahan et al. 2017), participants were asked to assess
which of two conclusions the results of a (fictional) study supported. In the
control version of the task, the study in question was on the efficacy of an exper-
imental crème for the treatment of skin rash. The study’s results were presented
as a two-by-two matrix, with one dimension denoting whether study subjects’
rash got better or worse, and the other denoting whether the subjects had received
the treatment or the placebo. Each cell contained a number indicating how many
people experienced a certain combination of these dimensions (e.g., people
whose rash got better and who had received the treatment). Participants had to
detect correlation between the variables in order to correctly solve the task. This
was so difficult that less than half of participants provided the correct answer
(i.e., the result was lower than chance), and performance increased with numer-
acy (a measure of deliberate processing ability) regardless of cultural back-
ground.
In the experimental version of the task, the study was on the effect of gun-control
legislation on crime. Here, the cells corresponded to cities that had either imple-
mented a gun-control law recently or not, and whether crime had increased or
decreased (e.g., one cell contained the number of cities that had not implemented
gun-control and had experienced a decrease in crime). Here, a sharp division
along cultural lines was seen. If given a version where the correct answer was
that crime had decreased as a result of gun control, then liberal participants were
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likely to find the correct response, and this likelihood increased sharply with
numeracy scores. However, conservative participants given this version were
very unlikely to find the correct response, and increased numeracy had no effect
on their likelihood to do so. The converse pattern was found for the version
where the correct response was that crime had increased: conservatives were
quite good at finding the correct response, and highly numerate conservatives
much more so than less numerate ones, and liberals were bad at finding the
correct response, with increased numeracy offering a very limited benefit. That
is, increased capacity to engage in deliberate reasoning helped attaining true
beliefs only when the evidence was supportive of one’s worldview. This suggests
that simply providing people with evidence or attempting to engage their delib-
erative faculty rather than heuristics will do little to correct false beliefs, when
these false beliefs are congenial to their cultural worldview. It further suggests
that, in general, one should not expect increased deliberative ability to lead to
convergence on truth, but rather that one should find the greatest amount of
cultural divergence among the most reflective, numerate, and educated.
Research from proponents of cultural cognition theory has borne this out.Across
a great many culturally contested domains related to risk, such as global warm-
ing, gun control, the HPV vaccine, and fracking, cultural polarization is largest
among those with the greatest reflective abilities (Kahan et al. 2012; Kahan et
al. 2010; Kahan et al. 2013; Kahan 2015). It thus becomes highly problematic
to refer to false beliefs that are the result of the mechanisms described by cultural
cognition theory as blunders. In many cases, they may be the result of a large
amount of deliberate reasoning, rather than an uncorrected heuristic. Likewise,
the notion that policy-makers can assume that people’s factual beliefs would
align with those of scientific experts if only they were to reflect more becomes
untenable. What one could expect is rather that increased reliance on deliberate
reasoning would lead to attitude polarization: more extreme versions of current
beliefs (Lord et al. 1979; Taber & Lodge 2006).
Naturally, far from all domains of risk are culturally contested. For example,
there is no cultural conflict over artificial food colourings or sweeteners, cell-
phone radiation, the MMR vaccine, or genetically modified foods (in the US, but
probably not in Europe), and in such domains one finds the expected pattern
predicted by bounded rationality theory: that higher scientific literacy and reflec-
tive capacity increases the likelihood of agreeing with scientific experts, across
cultural groups (Kahan 2015). Thus, one can view cultural cognition theory as
describing an important class of exceptions to the general bounded rationality
framework rather than as providing a full alternative.
It is an important and, to a large extent, unanswered question for cultural cogni-
tion theory why and how certain risks become culturally contested and whether
this can be reversed: the HPV vaccine apparently became culturally salient only
following a series of missteps on the part of its manufacturer (Kahan et al. 2010),
and even global warming was not a particularly divisive issue in the early 1990s
(McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014).
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3. LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC DECISIONMAKING
We said at the outset that determining the appropriate balance between relying
on experts and including lay citizens’ views required understanding what causes
citizens to sometimes disagree with experts about what things are risky and what
things are safe. We have now seen that the answer is, it’s complicated. With
respect to some risks, the beliefs of (many) citizens are influenced by heuristics
and, as a result, exhibit biases. In those cases, those who are the least scientifi-
cally literate and who rely the most on intuitive judgment tend to disagree most
with the experts. However, for a substantial number of risks, lay opinion is
divided along cultural lines. In these cases, agreement with experts is not corre-
lated with scientific literacy or deliberate, careful reasoning—rather the oppo-
site is true. Instead, an individual’s beliefs about the riskiness of some
phenomenon largely depends on whether that phenomenon is good or bad
according to her basic cultural worldview—her basic values. Furthermore, cases
where risk debates have become culturally charged are overrepresented among
the risks that exhibit the conflict between experts and (some) citizens, which is
our subject in this paper.
So what conclusion can we draw concerning risk management in a state that
aims to respect liberal-democratic values and to be enlightened?As noted in the
introduction, in assessing the political implications of risk psychology, we will
focus on claims that proponents of the two theories we have presented have
themselves made.We will structure our discussion according to three core ideas
in liberal-democratic political theory. First, there is the idea that public policy
should be responsive to the preferences of citizens—that is, that differences in
public opinion should register as differences in the policies implemented.
Second, there is the idea that policies should be such that they could enjoy the
assent of all those subject to them. This is most famously engendered in liberal
and ‘public reason’ accounts of political legitimacy. And third, there is the idea
that the public should directly participate through some form of society-wide
deliberation on policy issues. We will discuss the implications of the psycho-
logical theories for each of these ideas in turn. Before doing so, let us state a
couple of clarifications and assumptions.
First, when we are talking about people’s risk perceptions in a policy-making
context, we are not typically talking about pure factual beliefs. Rather, we are
typically talking about one of two things: (i) unprompted exclamations (letters
to the editor, demonstrations, etc.) to the effect that a certain risk is serious, an
activity is dangerous, or that something must be done about a risk, or (ii) support,
in one form or another, for proposals to regulate the relevant risky activity (e.g.,
by expressing such support in surveys, by voting for such policies directly in
referenda, or by basing one’s vote for representative bodies on the risk-regula-
tion platform of the relevant party or candidate). These are (more or less specific)
opinions concerning what policies should be enacted—they are policy
preferences.
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Second, we will assume that there is in fact consensus among scientific experts
concerning a given risk. Note here that experts’ views of risk are typically not
risk perceptions in the sense defined above (i.e., policy preferences). Rather,
they are estimates of the probabilities of various (primarily negative) effects of
a policy, such as deaths, other health effects, or environmental degradation. We
will also assume that (parts of) the public express policy preferences that are at
odds with this consensus, in the sense that the following three propositions are
true: (a) the public want a technology or another potentially risky thing restricted,
(b) this policy preference is based on a belief that the thing in question is risky,
and (c) expert consensus is that the thing is not very risky.
3.1. Responsiveness
While it is fairly uncontroversial that it is an ideal of democratic systems that
policies are responsive to the preferences of citizens, it is not clear what this
ideal entails more precisely. In particular, it is not clear what ‘public preferences’
means—it might be public opinion as expressed in polls, the preferences
expressed by those citizens who actively engage in political debate, or perhaps
the preferences policy-makers perceive to be prevalent in the population (see
Manza & Cook, 2002, pp. 631-632). Furthermore, it is not obvious what is
required for policies to be responsive to such preferences. Typical explications
merely hint at an answer, such as that politicians should take preferences into
account or that policy should be influenced by public preferences (Brooks &
Manza, 2006, pp. 474-475). How preferences should be taken into account or
how much they should influence policy is left open—although most agree that
“a perfect correspondence” is neither required nor desirable (Gilens, 2005,
p. 778).We want here to set aside debates about what responsiveness is or should
be. Instead, we focus on a more basic issue—namely, whether there is even a
prima facie requirement that the policies of a democratic state should be respon-
sive to citizens’ risk perceptions when these are in apparent conflict with expert
beliefs.
3.1.1. Sunstein
Sunstein can be seen as arguing that there is no such prima facie requirement.
At least, he argues that citizens’ policy preferences with respect to the regulation
of risk-creating activities should play a relatively limited role in policy making.
As an alternative, he argues that a major role should be given to cost-benefit
analyses performed by experts in regulatory agencies. More precisely, he
supports the current (as of 2016) United States system, in which a central agency
of the federal government (OIRA, the Office for Informational and Regulatory
Affairs) has a mandate to review and reject, on the basis of cost-benefit analy-
ses, regulations suggested by the various technical agencies dealing with envi-
ronmental, health, and safety policies (such as the Environmental Protection
Agency or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration). A main reason
for this is a belief that the technical agencies’ regulatory priorities reflect public
risk perceptions, rather than scientific estimates (Sunstein, 2002, p. 53, citing
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Roberts, 1990). The details of Sunstein’s proposals are complex, but the main
underlying idea is that policy need not be responsive to public risk perceptions,
since on his view these are largely (as we have seen above) the products of cogni-
tive biases of various kinds. This conclusion he derives from a general princi-
ple: “democratic governments should respond to people’s values, not to their
blunders” (Sunstein, 2005, p. 126). Since risk perceptions are based on blun-
ders, democratic governments are not required to be responsive to them.
Is he right about this? One possible reason to think that he is not arises if one
thinks that the general principle—that democracies should respond only to
values, not to blunders—is false. But it is an open question what it would mean
for the principle to be false, since it is unclear what the principle says. The prob-
lem is that “values” and “blunders” are not exhaustive of the possible descrip-
tions we may give of people’s psychological attitudes. True factual beliefs, for
example, are clearly neither values nor blunders. Sunstein’s principle, then, says
that policies should be responsive to people’s normative beliefs, but need not be
responsive to their false (or perhaps only obviously false) factual beliefs. This
leaves entirely open what we should do when different people or groups hold
divergent factual beliefs, none of which is clearly false. In other words,
Sunstein’s principle has nothing to say about the criteria for selecting which
factual beliefs, beyond the clearly false ones, should be allowed to play a role
in policy making.
Anatural solution to this problem is to add in a principle for selecting respectable
factual beliefs. One plausible such principle, congruent with the ideal of enlight-
ened decision making we mentioned in the introduction, would be to use science
as a standard-setter. On such a view, any belief conflicting with the scientifi-
cally established facts is not entitled to democratic responsiveness. There are
ways of questioning this principle, and especially ways of questioning whether
(and how) it could be justified given standard understandings of public reason
and the nature of factual disagreements (see, e.g., Jønch-Clausen & Kappel,
2015; 2016). However, we believe the price of giving it up is exceedingly large;
since the scientific method is the best known way of generating true factual
beliefs, it seems that denying that science can act as gatekeeper for beliefs is
tantamount to giving up on having any standards of right and wrong in the empir-
ical domain. So we will accept that beliefs in conflict with established scientific
fact are such that democratic governments need not respond to them.
An important caveat needs to be added. In a number of cases, among which are
many that are policy relevant, scientific knowledge comes with sizeable uncer-
tainties attached. This needs to be taken seriously by policy-makers. Uncertainty,
in effect, means that a number of states of affairs are consistent with the avail-
able evidence. In the case of risk, a plausible (but perhaps too simple) way of
fleshing this out is to assign only an interval of probabilities to a given event,
rather than a precise probability (for instance, the probability per year of dying
from exposure to pesticides may fall in the interval from one in one million to
one in two million). In the case of discrete possibilities—for example, whether
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gun control works to lower the number of gun-related deaths per year or not—
uncertainty means that we cannot believe either discrete possibility very strongly
(i.e., the maximum permissible credence for the proposition “gun control works”
is relatively close to 0.5). Where uncertainty is involved, the scientific evidence
thus does not permit us to give a unique answer to the policy-relevant ques-
tion—e.g., what the probability per year of dying from pesticide exposure is, or
whether gun control works to lower gun-related deaths. Instead, a number of
unique answers are possible. It does not fall within the remit of scientific experts
to select which of the set of scientifically permissible unique answers to use.
In many cases, however, policy choice depends on what unique answer is correct
in the following sense: if p1 is true, policy R1 is required (or preferable), but if
p2 is true, R2 is required. For example, if gun control works, then gun control
is (arguably) required—but if gun control does not work, gun control is not
required. In such cases, there is a gap between accepting Sunstein’s values-not-
blunders principle, and delegating decision-making authority to scientific
experts, even granting that ‘blunders’ includes every belief that is contrary to
what science says. Public risk perceptions may play some role in filling that gap.
Amore important problem with the values-not-blunders principle is that the risk
perceptions of ordinary people, being policy preferences, do not straightfor-
wardly fall on either side of the normative-factual belief divide. Consider how
an ideally rational person, of the kind one can meet in decision-theory textbooks,
would form her policy preferences concerning a risky activity. Such a person
would assign a probability and a value measure (“utility”) to each possible
outcome of each possible policy, multiply each probability by its utility and sum
these products, and advocate the policy that has the highest expected utility. So,
even for such a person, a call for a given policy is a consequence of a combina-
tion of factual and normative beliefs. Indeed, a policy preference can be made
consistent with any factual belief, given that the appropriate adjustments are
made to the person’s normative beliefs. The mere fact that the person calls for a
given policy does thus not in itself provide evidence that she has a factual belief
that is in conflict with the scientific facts.
However, as we have seen above, the bounded rationality theory that Sunstein
relies on provides positive reasons to think that people’s factual beliefs concern-
ing risk are often wrong.And (at least to a large extent) the basic fact that nonex-
perts’ beliefs about the magnitude of risks often diverge from the best scientific
estimates is not in dispute within psychology. So let us suppose that we can be
fairly certain that at least some people have erroneous factual beliefs about the
magnitudes of various risks. If it were possible to “implant” true beliefs into
such people, then it seems plausible that their risk perceptions (i.e., their more
or less precise beliefs about what policies should be enacted) would change.
A very plausible explication of the values-not-blunders principle is then this:
what democracy requires is responsiveness to the preferences that people would
have had if their factual beliefs were true (or at least not contrary to scientifically
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established facts).3 Call this their counterfactual fact-based preferences. In so far
as policy preferences that ordinary people express currently—call this their
actual preferences4—are different from their counterfactual fact-based prefer-
ences, actual preferences are not the kind of thing democracies need to be
responsive to.
The normative appeal of this ideal of policy-responsiveness seems to us consid-
erable (although one might want to consider some minimal criteria for what
normative beliefs are above board as well). Its main problem is its hypothetical
nature.We agree that the ideal form of democratic responsiveness is to the coun-
terfactual fact-based policy preferences of citizens. But in order to implement
responsiveness to counterfactual fact-based preferences, we must know (or have
reasonably justified beliefs about) what specific preferences a citizen or group
of citizens would have had, if they had believed the facts. Note that this is quite
a lot harder than having a justified belief that citizens would not have had their
actual preferences if they had believed the facts. The real challenge for those
who wish to implement responsiveness to counterfactual fact-based preferences
is to devise or point to some method for generating reasonably justified beliefs
about the specific preferences citizens would have had if they had believed the
facts. The only fail-safe way would be to make sure all citizens sincerely believe
the facts, to have them determine their policy preferences given those beliefs,
and then to make policy responsive to those preferences. But it is of course not
possible to run a counterfactual fact-based version of the entire democratic
process. So it seems that the best we can aim for is a method that we have reason
to believe generates preferences that are reasonable approximations to people’s
counterfactual preferences.
At least in some places, it seems that Sunstein believes that cost-benefit analy-
sis is a procedure that realizes this. Cost-benefit analysis builds on the approach
assumed in decision theory, where (as mentioned above) preferences are a func-
tion of separate factual beliefs and value judgments. With respect to factual
beliefs, cost-benefit analysis uses the best scientific estimates of the magnitude
of risks. As such, it clearly meets the criterion of nonresponsiveness to blunders
(although doubts can be had as to whether cost-benefit analysts neglect scientific
uncertainty (McGarity, 2002)). With respect to the value judgments, cost-bene-
fit analysts assign a monetary value to a given risk (e.g., a one-in-one-hundred-
thousand risk of death per year) based on studies of what people are willing to
pay to avoid such a risk, or of what they demand to be paid in order to accept
bearing such a risk. Typical ways of measuring willingness-to-pay are studies of
wage differentials between risky and safe jobs, and surveys asking people
directly for their valuations. Sunstein suggests that “the governing theory”
behind this approach “follows [people’s] own judgments about risk protection”
(Sunstein, 2014, p. 86). Although he also stresses that the current practice does
not fully realize the governing theory—in particular, it does not sufficiently take
into account differences in risk valuations across individuals—he seems to
believe that the general willingness-to-pay approach measures people’s own
valuations of a given risk (as he says, “the limitations [of current theory] are
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practical ones” (Sunstein, 2014, p. 136)). By combining these valuations with the
facts and assuming the framework of decision theory, cost-benefit analysis
arrives at the preferences people would have had if they had believed the facts.
The idea that the methods of cost-benefit analysis tracks people’s own valua-
tions—their counterfactual fact-based preferences—is not universally accepted.
It relies on extrapolation of behaviours in one context, in particular the labour
market, to all other contexts, and on assumptions from economics and rational
choice theory that are in many ways questionable (see, e.g., Anderson, 1993, ch.
9; Hausman, McPherson & Satz, 2017, ch. 9). Furthermore, the very same biases
and heuristics that Sunstein is eager to expel from risk management through the
use of scientific estimates are likely to influence people’s valuations of risks in
willingness-to-pay studies. Finally, survey studies frequently register a large
number of so-called protest valuations (where people state a willingness to pay
either nothing or an implausibly large amount, or perhaps decline to state a
number at all), indicating a rejection of the very idea of using willingness to pay
as a valuation measure for public goods (Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz & Grant,
1993). Such responses are typically disregarded, which suggests that cost-bene-
fit analysis is ill equipped to deal with preferences that are not of the type typi-
cally relevant in markets. Thus it does not succeed in capturing the
counterfactual fact-based preferences of those who reject treating a given policy
domain as appropriately governed by the ideals of a market economy.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the above are limited. We have merely
suggested that Sunstein’s proposal of delegating much of the policy-making
power to scientific experts doing cost-benefit analyses is not plausibly an ideal
solution to risk regulation. So even if Sunstein is right that risk perceptions—
of the unfiltered kind that are expressed in the various more or less precise calls
for risk-regulating policies—are too tainted by their partial source in cognitive
biases to be taken into account in policy making, his alternative may not be much
better. At least, his alternative does not embody ideal responsiveness (i.e.,
responsiveness to counterfactual fact-based preferences). It is doubtful that ideal
responsiveness can be fully realized in practice. It may be the case that the avail-
able realizable alternatives leave us with a dilemma: if we make policy respon-
sive to expressed risk perceptions, we will be overresponsive to false or
unscientific beliefs; but if we make policy unresponsive to these risk percep-
tions, we will be underresponsive to values. In other words, the seemingly simple
ideal of responsiveness to values and nonresponsiveness to blunders may be an
unattainable ideal. Call this the responsiveness dilemma.
3.1.2. Cultural cognition
Kahan and his coauthors argue that cultural cognition theory further undermines
Sunstein’s approach. Recall first what the cultural cognition theory says about
how people form risk perceptions. On the cultural cognition model, risk percep-
tions are not formed in the way assumed by decision theorists (and by
Sunstein)—that is, by combining pure factual beliefs about the numerical magni-
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tude of risks (expected deaths, probabilities of ecosystem damage, and the like)
with pure normative beliefs about how bad the various possible bad effects of a
policy are. Instead, people assess (probably mostly unconsciously) the relation-
ship between a possibly risky activity and their cultural worldview—and thus
assess at the same time whether restricting the activity is justifiable, or perhaps
required, according to their view of the ideal society. Thus, as we mentioned
above, hierarchical individualists balk at regulation of industry because it ques-
tions the competence of elites (hierarchy) and assumes the inadequacy of market
solutions (individualism). Conversely, egalitarians dislike the activity of capi-
talist industry generally, and thus welcome restrictions. Based on such general
assessments of the value of activities and of restrictions on them, people form
factual as well as normative beliefs about the risks and benefits of the activity,
in a kind of post-rationalization procedure, in which motivated assessment of
evidence concerning the effects of the activity and policy is central.5 Conse-
quently, “citizens invariably conclude that activities that affirm their preferred
way of life are both beneficial and safe, and those that denigrate it are both
worthless and dangerous,” and even the factual aspect of risk perceptions (could
they be isolated) “express [citizens’] worldviews” (Kahan et al. 2006, p. 1105).
Kahan et al. argue that cultural cognition theory undermines Sunstein’s view in
two related ways. First, they claim that Sunstein’s strategy of using cost-bene-
fit analysis to realize the values-not-blunders ideal “borders on incoherence”
(Kahan et al., 2006, p. 1105). In other words, the fact that risk perceptions are
due to cultural cognition means that the cost-benefit approach does not realize
the ideal embodied in the values-not-blunders principle. On one reading, this
would merely be the claim we have just made: that cost-benefit analysis fails to
respect values. But of course this would be completely independent of the
cultural cognition theory. The values we have argued are overridden in cost-
benefit analysis are ordinary normative beliefs (about the value of a human life,
say), not culturally influenced factual beliefs (about how many lives a certain
activity will claim). Second, they suggest that “bringing the role of cultural
cognition into view severely undermines the foundation for Sunstein’s refusal to
afford normative significance to public risk evaluations generally” (Kahan et
al., 2006, p. 1004). That is, they suggest that acknowledging the role of cultural
cognition undermines the case for nonresponsiveness to citizens’ actual policy
preferences.
How might the fact that people’s risk perceptions are shaped by cultural cogni-
tion further undermine the cost-benefit analysts’ approach and/or strengthen the
case for responsiveness to actual preferences?We suggest that cultural cognition
points to two different facts that may be important: (1) that the relationships
between values (in the form of cultural worldviews), factual beliefs, and policy
preferences are not as Sunstein and others assume, and (2) that risk perceptions
are rooted in cultural worldviews, and therefore are expressions of citizens’
values.
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Let us first consider issue (1). Here, the claim would be that the fact that risk
perceptions are due to cultural cognition means that they do not behave in ways
that Sunstein and others assume—for example, that changes in factual beliefs do
not change preferences in the way assumed—and that this undermines the strat-
egy of cost-benefit analysis further and/or strengthens the case for responsive-
ness to actual preferences. Such a claim could be made in two ways:
(i) Since both factual beliefs and policy preferences are due to the same under-
lying cause, we should not expect changes in factual beliefs to change policy
preferences. As Kahan et al. put it,
risk perceptions originating in cultural evaluation are not ones indi-
viduals are likely to disown once their errors are revealed to them. Even
if individuals could be made to see that their cultural commitments had
biased their review of factual information … they would largely view
those same commitments as justifying their policy preferences regard-
less of the facts. (Kahan et al. 2006, p. 1105)
On this reading, an individual’s counterfactual fact-based preferences are likely
to be the same as his actual preferences (i.e., the preference he would hold if he
believed the facts is likely to be the same as the preference he currently holds).
If that is the case, people’s actual preferences are at least a good approximation
of their counterfactual fact-based preferences. Thus we have a solution to the
problem of how to achieve responsiveness to counterfactual fact-based prefer-
ences—namely, to use actual preferences. Or, to put the matter differently, it is
not true that responsiveness to actual preferences is overresponsiveness to faulty
factual beliefs, since actual preferences are not influenced by factual beliefs at
all—faulty or not. Reading (i) would, then, give reason to be responsive to citi-
zens’ actual preferences.
Reading (i) faces two problems. The first problem is that the claim that changes
in factual beliefs do not change policy preferences seems too strong, and it goes
beyond what can be justified by the evidence that the cultural cognition theory
relies on. Cultural cognition is primarily a thesis about how cultural commit-
ments lead to biased assessment of evidence, such that one believes the evidence
supports the factual beliefs that fits one’s cultural commitments best. But it is
possible to debias people at least to some degree, and to bring them towards
mutual agreement on the facts. And furthermore, there is evidence that such
debiasing alters people’s policy preferences, bringing previously opposed parties
closer together (Cohen et al., 2007). So it seems to us that the fact of cultural
cognition does not justify ignoring the problem of overresponsiveness to false
beliefs.
The second problem is that, at least in many policy domains, preferences may
lose some of their claim to democratic responsiveness if they turn out to be too
resistant to the facts. Resistance to changes in factual beliefs may reveal policy
preferences to be based in kinds of value judgments that are unacceptable from
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a liberal-democratic point of view—e.g., a desire to regulate purely private
behaviour (such as sexual behaviour or harmless commercial activities) or
worldviews that deny the fundamental equality of all citizens (such as racist or
sexist views). If it were the case that citizens’ policy preferences would not
change regardless of what the facts are, we would at least need to examine the
substantive content of those preferences in more detail—and to reserve judg-
ment as to whether those preferences merit democratic responsiveness until we
have a better understanding of what that substantive content is.
(ii) Since policy preferences and factual beliefs are both caused by people’s
cultural worldviews (i.e., their most basic values), any change in factual beliefs
requires a change in basic values.
Suppose a given citizen actually has faulty factual beliefs, and that these beliefs
are due to cultural cognition.According to reading (ii), the basic values this citi-
zen actually holds are not the basic values she would hold in the counterfactual
case where she came to believe the facts. The cost-benefit analysts’ method is
essentially an attempt to disentangle actual factual beliefs from actual value
judgments. The analysis then recombines actual value judgments with the true
facts, and thereby generates a policy preference. But on reading (ii), such an
approach does not succeed in revealing citizens’ counterfactual fact-based pref-
erences. The cost-benefit method uses a citizen’s actual values, but cultural
cognition shows that these are likely to be different from her counterfactual fact-
based values. In other words, a citizen’s counterfactual fact-based preferences
are not (as Sunstein believes) a function of her actual values and the facts, but a
function of a new set of values and the facts.
Reading (ii) would show that the cost-benefit analysts’method does not success-
fully track people’s counterfactual fact-based preferences. It also suggests that
it is difficult to predict how people’s preferences would change if they sincerely
came to believe facts that are in conflict with their cultural worldviews. Thus it
lends support to the use of more deliberative methods, wherein real flesh-and-
blood people are allowed to undergo a change in their views in response to facts
and arguments (unlike methods like cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to infer
what people would prefer from data about what they actually believe, value, and
prefer). Consequently, the “deliberative debiasing” methods Kahan et al. argue in
favour of using are supported by this reading (Kahan et al., 2006, pp. 1100-1104).
Kahan et al.’s other claim—that cultural cognition supports responsiveness to
actual preferences—is not supported by reading (ii). At best, reading (ii) shows
cost-benefit analysis to be a worse approximation of the ideal of responsiveness
to counterfactual fact-based preferences than we might otherwise have thought.
However, this merely makes the responsiveness dilemma worse, by making one
of the horns of that dilemma worse. It is not obvious, however, that reading (ii)
is of much help in deciding how to choose when faced with a responsiveness
dilemma—that is, if we have to choose between responsiveness to actually
expressed preferences and (something like) cost-benefit analysis.
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Let us now move to issue (2), the fact that cultural cognition theory shows risk
perceptions to be expressions of values. Kahan et al. state that “when expert
regulators reject as irrational public assessments of the risks associated with
putatively dangerous activities … they are in fact overriding values” (Kahan et
al. 2006, p. 1105). It is, unfortunately, not clear what is meant by “public assess-
ments of … risks” in this quote. On the one hand, the phrase might refer to policy
preferences, such as that a given activity A is dangerous and should be regu-
lated. On the other hand, it might refer to people’s purely factual beliefs about
the magnitude of risks. Let us now consider each of these two readings of issue
(2) in turn (we call them readings (iii) and (iv) to avoid confusion with (i) and
(ii) above):
(iii) Experts are overriding G1’s values because they implement a policy R2 that
is different from G1’s preferred policy R1.
Recall that the kind of case we are interested in has the following structure: (a)
the public wants a technology or another potentially risky thing restricted, (b)
this policy preference is based on a belief that the thing in question is risky, and
(c) expert consensus is that the thing is not very risky. In the group-based frame-
work of cultural cognition, ‘the public’ should be replaced with some cultural
group. So we assume that a cultural group G1 wants the activity A restricted
through policy R1, and that G1 wants this because they believe p, that A carries
certain risks. The experts, based on sound science, believe Øp (i.e., that A does
not carry those risks) and therefore implement a policy R2 that does not restrict
A appreciably.
In cases of this kind, it is hard to see why we should accept that implementing
a policy other than R1 overrides G1’s values. By assumption, G1 prefers R2
because they believe p—the implication being that they would not have
preferred R1 if they had believed Øp (i.e., that R1 is not their counterfactual
fact-based policy preference). Once more, there are now two possibilities for
what G1’s policy preference would then have been if they had believedØp. First,
G1 might have preferred, or at least acquiesced to, R2, the policy implemented
by the experts. In that case, the expert decision procedure would have achieved
its ideal aim. Thus there would be no reason to be responsive to G1’s actual pref-
erence, and we would have no reason to object to the experts’ decision procedure
either. Second, G1 might have preferred some third possible policy R3. In that
case, we would still have no reason to demand that policy be responsive to G1’s
actual preferences. However, there would be reason to complain that the experts’
decision procedure has failed to be responsive to G1’s values. Insofar as we
cannot tell a priori whether G1 would have preferred (or acquiesced to) R2 or
not, the conclusion that follows is that we cannot be confident that the experts’
decision procedure is responsive to G1’s values, in the absence of some effort
to determine what G1’s counterfactual fact-based preferences are.
But perhaps the assumption that G1 prefers R1 because they believe p is not
correct. That is, perhaps the case is one in which G1 would prefer R1 regardless
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of the facts—G1’s factual belief that A is dangerous is merely a post hoc ration-
alization of the group’s policy preference, which it holds for other reasons than
that A is dangerous. Kahan and Braman (2008, pp. 51-54) suggest that it is only
in cases of this kind—where people would not alter their policy preference even
if they came to believe the facts—that there is a demand for policy responsive-
ness to preferences.At the same time, however, they speculate that people would
not be inclined to hold on to their preferences if they were to realize that their
factual beliefs are the product of cultural cognition, at least in the case they are
discussing (cases of self-defence). The same might well be the case in typical
instances of risk regulation. In the case where people would hold on to their
policy preferences after coming to believe the facts, the problem we mentioned
under reading (i) above recurs: G1’s preference for R1 has some basis other than
that A is in fact risky, and that basis may show the preference to be less reason-
able than it initially seemed.
Consider, for example, the case of regulation of industry pollution. Recall that
hierarchical individualists tend to be sceptical of such regulation because it casts
doubt on the competence of societal elites and the ability of market forces to
solve problems, and consequently tend to believe that the risks associated with
industry pollution are low. But suppose hierarchical individualists were brought
to sincerely believe that some industry’s emission of a certain chemical C creates
severe risks to the health of those exposed, but that they persisted in their policy
preference (not to regulate). What could the basis of such that preference then
be, other than a blatant disregard for the welfare of those who will likely suffer
health problems? A similar problem arises for egalitarians, who are inclined to
approve of restrictions of “commerce and industry, which they see as sources of
unjust social disparities” (Kahan, 2012, p. 728), and who consequently tend to
believe that the risks associated with industry pollution are high. Suppose egal-
itarians persisted in their desire to regulate emissions of C even after having
sincerely accepted that C does not pose a serious risk to anyone. The only possi-
ble basis of such a preference is then a general anti-industry agenda. By persist-
ing in their preferences, both the hierarchical individualists and the egalitarians
would violate basic norms of risk regulation, such as that people have some right
to be protected against serious risks and that harmless private behaviour cannot
be restricted.
Thus it seems to us that in the case of risk regulation there is reason to be scep-
tical of policy preferences that would not change if people were to come to
believe the facts. So, while the possibility that policy preferences would not
change if people came to believe the facts does provide some reason to be
responsive to those preferences, there will simultaneously be a reason not to be
responsive. However, in cases where people merely overestimate risk (or under-
estimate, as the case may be), persisting in policy preference is less problematic.
It may reflect, for example, a judgment that the aim of protecting people’s health
is very important relative to the aim of securing favourable conditions for busi-
ness. But this is just the general problem with cost-benefit analysis we identified
above. It is not obvious that the phenomenon of cultural cognition adds much to
that problem.
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(iv) Experts are overriding G1’s values by denying the pure factual beliefs of G1
(i.e., p), since those factual beliefs express values.
Since believing p is an expression of G1’s values, the validity of G1’s values is
denied when expert regulators implement a policy based on the fact that Øp is
true. We think the view that merely denying (a group of) citizens’ factual views
is to be underresponsive to their values has both strange and dangerous impli-
cations. Suppose, for example, that the experts in this case implement G1’s
preferred policy R1, but also believe (and state publicly)Øp. On the view consid-
ered, the implication would be that the experts’ policy making is insufficiently
responsive to the values of G1 in this case, even though G1 got its preferred
policy implemented. That seems to us a strange implication, which requires an
excessive demand for responsiveness.
Alternatively, consider a case like the one we mentioned above, where G1 would
at least acquiesce to the expert’s implementation of R2 if they were to come to
believe the truth (i.e., Øp). One might think that, since the belief p is an expres-
sion of G1’s values, implementing R2 exhibits a lack of responsiveness to G1’s
values even though R2 is G1’s counterfactual fact-based preference (or a least
would be acceptable to G1 in those counterfactual circumstances). In effect, this
would amount to denying that policy preferences that unequivocally depend on
factual beliefs that do not meet the required correctness criterion (i.e., beliefs
that are blunders or contrary to scientifically established facts) do not merit
democratic responsiveness. This seems to us a dangerous implication. In factual
matters, priority must be given to the truth, and to our best methods for finding
out the truth.And in fact, Kahan et al. seem to share our worry here. In a response
to Sunstein’s response to their original paper, Kahan and Slovic “admit to a fair
measure of ambivalence about when beliefs formed as a result of cultural cogni-
tion merit normative respect within a democratic society,” and concede that “if
we came off sounding as if we think democracy entails respecting all culturally
grounded risk perceptions, no matter how empirically misguided they might be,
we overstated our position” (Kahan & Slovic, 2006, pp. 170-171).
In conclusion, Kahan et al.’s scepticism towards Sunstein’s proposed use of
expert cost-benefit analysis is largely warranted, but it is questionable if the fact
of cultural cognition contributes much to the problems with cost-benefit analy-
sis. To be sure, cultural cognition provides a different set of reasons for thinking
that cost-benefit analysis does not succeed in tracking counterfactual fact-based
preferences—but arguably that claim was already very well supported by other
reasons. Furthermore, cultural cognition theory provides only very limited
reason to be responsive to actual preferences in cases where these are in conflict
with experts’ scientific assessments of the riskiness of an activity. Cultural cogni-
tion theory therefore does not warrant solving the responsiveness dilemma in
favour of responsiveness to actual preferences. It does, however, provide support
for using deliberative debiasing techniques to solve that dilemma.
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3.2. Liberal legitimacy
We now move from the democratic to the liberal aspect of the liberal-democra-
tic ideal—more precisely, to the liberal conception of legitimacy. According to
this conception, political power is legitimate only if could be reasonably
accepted by all subject to it. While many philosophers are attracted to some
version of the liberal legitimacy principle, there is no general agreement on what
the principle precisely amounts to. It is controversial how demanding the require-
ment that political power be acceptable to all is—does it require that all can
accept the basic procedure by which laws and policies are made (Rawls’s view)
or does it require that each law or policy be reasonably acceptable to all? The
latter is obviously a much more demanding criterion. It is likewise controversial
how demanding the reasonability clause is—should our conception of reason-
ability be such that the acceptance of most people as they really exist is required,
or do we need to secure acceptance only from people whose views meet higher
standards of justifiability?And there are more conflicts as well (for an overview,
see Quong, 2013).
Kahan et al. suggest that the cultural cognition theory does have important impli-
cations for how policy may be made if it is to be legitimate on the liberal concep-
tion. On Kahan et al.’s explication of the liberal ideal, it consists in an “injunction
that the law steer clear of endorsing a moral or cultural orthodoxy” (Kahan et al.
2006, p. 1106). They then go on to suggest that “it is questionable whether risk
regulation should be responsive to public demands for regulation, since these
express cultural worldviews”—that is, exactly the kind of views that it would be
wrong for policy to endorse according to the liberal ideal. So even though Kahan
et al. seem to believe that the dubious factual basis of risk-related policy pref-
erences is not sufficient to strip them of their claim to democratic responsiveness,
they suggest that there are liberal reasons for making policy nonresponsive to
such preferences.
Kahan et al. do not elaborate what they mean by “endors[ing] a moral or cultural
orthodoxy.” But since they cite the writings of BruceAckerman and John Rawls
in support of the principle, let us assume that the following, common liberal idea
is what Kahan et al. have in mind: legitimacy requires policies to be justified
only with reference to reasons that are public, in the sense that all reasonable citi-
zens agree that these reasons count in favour of (or against, as the case may be)
policies. Now suppose we have identified an exhaustive set of such reasons, and
that these are the only ones actually given weight in the policy-making process.
Obviously policies at the same time will reflect factual assumptions about how
much various policies realize the values defined by public reasons. If the cultural
cognition theory is correct, factual assumptions are not value neutral, since each
set of factual assumptions expresses a cultural worldview.
What is the import of this for liberal legitimacy? The basic question is what it
means that factual assumptions express worldviews and when that would be a
problem. Suppose a policy is justified only on the basis of public reasons and the
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facts. In that case, it seems to us strange to say that the policy in question is illib-
eral merely because the facts are (coincidentally) endorsed by adherents of one
cultural worldview. ‘Expressing a worldview’ must refer to something more
substantial than this kind of correspondence to a worldview if it is to be a liberal
problem. This reflects the basic assumption we endorsed earlier—namely, that
the facts, and scientific methods of establishing facts, ought to have priority in
policy making.
Perhaps the problem arises only in cases where there is genuine uncertainty
about what the facts are. Suppose that the scientific evidence concerning gun
control allows for believing either that gun control does prevent deaths from
firearm accidents and crimes (call this p) or that gun control does not prevent
such deaths (Øp).6 And suppose further that the public reasons bearing on the
case are such that if p is true, then gun control should be implemented, and ifØp
is true, gun control should not be implemented (e.g., because there is a presump-
tion of liberty). So policy must endorse either p or Øp, in the sense that one
policy follows from p and a different policy follows from Øp. Supposing that p
reflects the cultural worldview of one group G1 and that Øp reflects the world-
view of G2, it seems that policy must endorse one group’s worldview although
the other group’s view is not in conflict with science.
Suppose that one thinks that basing policy on either of p or Øp would be illib-
eral. Such a view would run into the following problem: it is a plausible require-
ment for any criterion of legitimacy that at least one policy is legitimate. But in
the example given here, we must either say that both policies are legitimate or
that neither policy is legitimate, since they are symmetrically situated with
respect to their basis in both public reasons and factual assumptions. Since the
view that neither policy is legitimate is not a viable option, we must say that
both policies are legitimate. Consequently, G1 does not have a viable complaint
that a no-gun-control policy is illegitimate, although it does in one sense express
the cultural worldview of G2—and similarly G2 has no legitimacy complaint
against gun control.
Another possible interpretation of what it means that a policy preference
expresses a worldview is that the worldview is the real, causal explanation for
why a certain person or group has the preference. On this reading, calls for regu-
lation of a given risk, although seemingly justified by reference to public reasons,
are really caused by “an unjust desire to use the expressive capital of the law for
culturally imperialist ends” (Kahan et al., 2006, p. 1107). Suppose the policy in
question is above board in the sense that some combination of public reasons and
scientifically acceptable factual assumptions would justify the policy.Would the
fact that this legitimate rationale is not the real reason why the policy is imple-
mented constitute a legitimacy problem? The assumption here is that the group
implementing the policy sincerely (and correctly) believes that the policy has a
legitimate rationale, a fact that they exploit in order to implement a policy that
they desire in any case. Such a group could be accused of an unattractive oppor-
tunism. But this does not constitute a legitimacy problem on the orthodox inter-
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pretations of the liberal legitimacy criterion.7 The liberal criterion stresses the
importance of all groups being able to reasonably accept the policy. Since the
policy here is ex hypothesi justifiable based on a set of normative assumptions
and a set of factual assumptions, both of which are reasonable (i.e., the set of
public reasons and the set of scientifically accepted facts, respectively), all
groups are able to reasonably accept the policy. It would be unreasonable for a
group to demand that the factual assumptions best expressing their worldview
be the basis of the law rather than another set of reasonable factual assumptions.
We conclude, then, that the fact that factual beliefs express cultural worldviews
in the way the cultural cognition theory has revealed does not entail any prob-
lems from the point of view of the liberal conception of legitimacy in cases
where policies are justifiable based on reasonable normative and factual beliefs.
3.3. Deliberation
In the previous section we discussed public reason as (a part of) a substantive
account of policies’ legitimacy. We were thus concerned with whether a certain
class of reasons provide sufficient justification for a policy. But ‘public reason’
is also frequently used to refer to a certain norm of deliberation. Here, the
concern is not so much whether a policy could be justified with reference to
agreed-upon, public reasons, but what reasons we may make appeal to in the
process of policy making—in public and parliamentary debate, in the civil serv-
ice, and in courts. According to the deliberative norm of public reason, citizens,
politicians, judges, and others may appeal only to reasons that are neutral
between reasonable conceptions of the good. The idea, then, is to remove all
appeals to contested worldviews from the public arena.
Kahan (2007) takes issue with this public-reason norm. On Kahan’s reading, the
public-reason norm has two rationales: First, it disciplines those in power by
demanding that they pursue only policies that they sincerely believe are
supported by public reasons.And second, it protects those out of power by ensur-
ing that laws are such that they can accept them without thereby denouncing
their vision of the good life (Kahan, 2007, p. 129). But, according to Kahan, the
cultural cognition theory reveals that the public-reason norm fails to produce
either of its promised effects. The demand for secular justifications does not
prevent those in power from imposing their vision of the good on society, since
even the sincerely held belief that a policy promotes the public good reflects a
cultural worldview. And the demand does not ensure that political losers accept
policies enacted by their opponents either. More likely, they will interpret oppo-
nents’ arguments for those policies as disingenuous and reflecting a “smug insis-
tence of their adversaries that such policies reflect a neutral and objective
commitment to the good of all citizens” (Kahan, 2007, p. 131).
Kahan suggests that the public-reason norm be replaced with its polar opposite,
which he calls the “expressive overdetermination” norm.According to this norm,
justifications of policies in the public forum should not avoid references to
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contested worldviews and conceptions of the good—they should instead attempt
to show how the relevant policy promotes the substantial cultural commitments
of all groups. Casting this in Rawlsian terms, we might say that the desire for
overlapping consensus among adherents of rival comprehensive views should
not lead us to ban reference to the content of these comprehensive views—say,
to religious values, strongly egalitarian ideals, or free-market principles. Instead
we should attempt to show that all of these values, in all their comprehensive
thickness, support some policy (Kahan, 2007, pp. 131-132). The proposal builds
on research from social psychology on self-affirmation. The kinds of biases in
processing of evidence highlighted by cultural cognition theory stem from a
motivation to defend one’s identity by defending factual beliefs perceived to be
important to the groups with which one identifies. Self-affirmation research has
shown that these defensive motivations, and therefore the biases, are decreased
when aspects of subjects’ personal or social identities are affirmed—for exam-
ple, by allowing them to write a brief essay outlining a value or group member-
ship that is important to them. In effect, affirmation provides an identity buffer
such that one can afford to lower one’s cognitive defenses. People whose iden-
tities have been affirmed are thus more objective in assessing evidence and argu-
ments, either written or during discussions (Sherman & Cohen 2002; Cohen et
al. 2000; Correll et al. 2004; Cohen et al. 2007). Expressive overdetermination
takes advantage of this: highlighting that a policy is in line with the values of
one’s group is taken to be one way of affirming the importance of that value. If
so, one can expect people to be less biased in assessing the risks and benefits of
the policy. Thus, expressive overdetermination is meant to achieve the goals of
having public policy recognized by all groups as legitimate, and of diffusing the
intensely conflictual nature of politics.
Kahan et al. (2015) provide direct evidence that expressive overdetermination
may be effective. Hierarchical individualists were more likely to rate a study
concluding that extant emission limits would be insufficient to avoid environ-
mental catastrophe as valid and to express that climate change posed a high risk
if they had previously been exposed to a study suggesting that geoengineering
was a necessary element in combating climate change. Since geoengineering
does not involve imposing restrictions on free enterprise or suggest that corpo-
rate elites are unable to solve collective problems, this framing highlighted that
the reality of climate change need not threaten hierarchical individualist values.
In fact, these values were affirmed insofar as a privately driven use of technol-
ogy was cast as necessary to combat climate change. This allowed hierarchical
individualists to assess the evidence more objectively without threat to their
identity.
The realization that seemingly conflict-diffusing mechanisms, such as the public-
reason norm, may in fact not work—or may even be counterproductive—seems
to us to be the most directly useful insight for political philosophy that follows
from the understanding of cultural cognition. Nevertheless, we do have some
misgivings about the expressive-overdetermination norm and about Kahan’s
dismissal of the public-reason norm.
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Let us start with the latter. Is it really true that the public-reason norm fails to
deliver on both of its promises? First, consider whether the norm disciplines
those in power. The cultural cognition theory shows that the mere fact that those
in power sincerely believe policies to be supported by public reasons does not
ensure that policies are in fact so supported. However, it remains plausible that
the public-reason norm contributes to the aim of liberally legitimate policies.
The mere demand that evidence that a certain policy promotes publically recog-
nized goods must be produced will likely provide some constraints on what poli-
cies will be implemented by conscientious adherents to the public-reason norm.
Although processing of evidence is culturally biased as described above, there
are limits to the degree to which people can pick the evidence that suits them
(Kunda 1990). Furthermore, there is evidence (Vinokur & Burnstein 1978;
Luskin et al. 2012; Cohen et al. 2007) that deliberations between adherents of
conflicting worldviews or ideologies brings these people closer together with
respect to their factual beliefs. Insofar as the willingness (and perhaps even
active desire) to engage with the arguments of political opponents is also a part
of the public-reason norm, it has resources to diffuse the kind of conflicts that
arise from cultural cognition as well.
Second, consider the protective aim of public reason. A corollary of the above
is that the public-reason norm does not plausibly increase the likelihood that
liberally illegitimate policies will be enacted (rather, it plausibly lowers that like-
lihood). So there is no reason to think that losers are less well protected under
the public-reason norm than in the case where appeals to “thick” values can
freely be made. What the cultural cognition theory shows with respect to losers
is that they are likely to feel aggrieved even when they have no right to do so
(since policies are legitimate). So only if the goal is to ensure actual acceptance
on the part of losers does the public-reason norm fail. This is a worthy goal, but
less important than protecting them from illiberal cultural imperialism.
Now what about the expressive-overdetermination norm as an alternative?
Supposing that Kahan accepts the standard public-reason account of legitimacy,
expressive overdetermination does not contribute to the legitimacy of policies.
On that account, a policy that is in fact justifiable by reference to public reasons
only is legitimate. The fact that a group falsely believes that a policy is not so
justifiable does not alter the fact that it is. Furthermore, expressive overdeter-
mination does not contain any resources that increase the likelihood of policies
that are in fact legitimate, or any resources that lower the likelihood of policies
that are not legitimate.
There are nonstandard accounts of public reason that may be more conducive to
seeing expressive overdetermination as having a legitimacy-creating role. On
the convergence view of Gerald Gaus, for example, legitimacy requires that each
citizen be able to support the policy from within her own total view (Gaus, 2011;
Gaus and Vallier, 2009). Gaus’s main argument for viewing legitimacy in this
way is that reasons that people hold as part of their comprehensive view, but
which are not public reasons, may defeat the justification of a policy based on
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public reasons. Consequently, people would not be able to sincerely accept the
imposition of that policy. This line of argument meshes well with the protection
function of deliberative norms as Kahan describes it. However, the convergence
view faces the potential problem that there will often not be a policy that can gain
support from all comprehensive points of view. Additional principles for deter-
mining what policies are legitimate in such cases are then needed. Gaus has
developed an elaborate theory for this purpose, but nothing Kahan has written
suggests that he would go along with Gaus in this regard. If a legitimacy-incur-
ring role for expressive overdetermination is to be grounded in an account like
Gaus’s, much work remains to be done to flesh out the theory.
Return now to more standard accounts of public reason. Since expressive
overdetermination does not contribute to policies’ legitimacy, it seems that the
expressive-overdetermination norm can be justified only instrumentally, as a
means to an end. The most immediately obvious end that the norm serves is to
ensure actual acceptance of policies by all groups. And actual acceptance is
presumably valuable because it realizes the aims of disciplining the powerful
and protecting the powerless. But there is some reason to be sceptical that actual
acceptance will realize those goals. Expressive overdetermination can be used
to secure acceptance from groups without substantially respecting their values.
Consider an example that Kahan points to—namely, French abortion law. This
law gives women access to abortions, but in order to secure acceptance from
conservatives, this access is available only in an “emergency” (Kahan, 2007,
p. 132). However, no criteria for what constitutes an emergency were included,
and no questioning of a woman’s own declaration that an emergency exists is
allowed. In effect, then, the emergency clause is substantively empty, and was
included only for its symbolic meaning. While this construction did succeed in
creating a consensus on the policy, it is hard to see why those who believe in any
serious way that non-emergency abortions is a problem should have been satis-
fied with this law.8
On the other hand, expressive overdetermination might be used for another
end—namely, to enable people holding conflicting views to converge on the
facts (cf. the climate change study described above), and hence to diffuse or
avoid cultural conflict over factual questions. Kahan et al. have provided strong
evidence that the public-reason norm does not realize this goal particularly well,
and that a norm of expressive overdetermination can (perhaps somewhat coun-
terintuitively) realize the goal better. However, and as Kahan himself recognizes,
expressive overdetermination is merely one tool for achieving fact convergence.9
4. CONCLUSION
We have argued above that the psychological facts of risk perception are
complex. Divergences between experts and lay citizens are sometimes at least
partly a reflection of lack of scientific literacy and overreliance on heuristics on
the part of some citizens. But in other cases, cultural worldviews seem to be
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behind differences of opinion over what is risky and what is not. And in fact
those seem to be the cases that are most interesting politically, such as global
warming, environmental issues, or GM foods (in Europe).
However, we have also argued that the fact that faulty beliefs express people’s
basic values has few implications for how liberal-democratic states should go
about formulating policy with respect to putatively risky activities and tech-
nologies. Contrary to what proponents of cultural cognition argue, the fact that
risk perceptions express cultural worldviews does not give us stronger reasons
than we would otherwise have for making policy responsive to such percep-
tions. Similarly, the fact that factual beliefs about risks express visions of the
ideal society does not undermine the legitimacy of using scientifically accepted
facts as the basis for policy making.
This largely means that we are stuck with the responsiveness dilemma that we
identified in our discussion of Sunstein’s view: if policy is insulated from the
people, we risk being underresponsive to citizens’ values, and if policy is made
in a more populist manner, we risk overresponsiveness to false beliefs. However,
the cultural cognition theory does provide some important insights into how this
dilemma can be resolved. It supports the case for using structured deliberation
methods to determine what citizens’ preferences would be if they were to come
to accept scientific facts. And it provides significant guidance for those of us
who want to reform political discourse in a way that enables reasonable discus-
sion of policies based on common acceptance of the relevant facts.
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NOTES
1 This is a bit of a simplification. Bounded rationality is also consistent with mistakes being
due to a lack of information or to social processes such as information cascades or group polar-
ization (Anderson & Holt 1997; Moscovici & Zavalloni 1969; Sunstein 2002).
2 However, the ecological rationality programme of Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues points out
that, far from being a source of ubiquitous bias, heuristics can often be beneficial, providing
“fast and frugal” decision procedures that can rival or even beat analytical approaches
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996; Czerlinski et al. 1999).
3 Discussing the phenomenon of “nudging,” where policy proposals have similarly been justi-
fied with reference the psychology of heuristics and biases, one observer suggests that the
people arguing for such policies “generally believe that social policy should aim to satisfy
purified preferences” (Hausman, 2016). “Purified” preferences are preferences people would
have had, if they had not been the victims of biases.
4 Here, and generally in the paper, we use the word ‘actually’ to indicate what is the case in the
actual world, as that concept is typically used in possible-worlds ways of speaking of coun-
terfactuals and alethic concepts such as necessity and possibility. That is, we use ‘actual’ to
indicate what is currently the case in the world in which we find ourselves.
5 There are two likely mechanisms at play: First, people form beliefs about whether a given
type of risk regulation is desirable, based directly on their cultural worldview. That is, there
is a direct causal link from worldviews to policy preferences. Second, people form factual
beliefs—about the numerical magnitude of risks—through motivated cognition, wherein
cultural worldviews affect people’s assessment of the evidence concerning the riskiness (or
safety) of an activity. Here, the causal link goes from worldviews to assessment of evidence,
and thus to pure factual beliefs, and then in a second step from those factual beliefs to policy
preferences. Since pure factual beliefs are not easily disentangled from policy preferences
(see, e.g., Kahan & Slovic, 2006, pp. 166-168), it is difficult to test which of these mechanisms
is the dominant one. However, in a study of self-defence cases, Kahan and Braman found
support for the view that “the influence that values exert over outcome judgments is mediated
by the impact of the commitments on individuals’ perceptions of the facts” (Kahan and
Braman, 2008, p. 45)—i.e., for the second mechanism.
6 Kahan’s own treatment of this case (2007, pp. 120-122) seems to imply that this is the case.
However, more recent evidence suggests that gun control does, in fact, lower gun-related
injuries and fatalities. See Santaella-Tenorio, Cerdá, Villaveces and Galea, 2016.
7 There is some debate among theorists of public reason regarding the appropriate role of sincer-
ity. Some views within this debate hold it to be a requirement for legitimacy that public reasons
are the actual motivation for people’s advocacy of a given policy (see Schwartzmann, 2011,
pp. 387-390). Kahan et al. may of course defend their position by endorsing such a view, but
in doing so they would no longer be able to claim the support of the liberal principle of legit-
imacy tout court.
8 Of course, one might not think that the anti-abortion party’s views were such that they ought
to be respected on a liberal view of legitimacy—but the example is illustrative of the risk that
expressive overdetermination can be used to manipulate groups to accept policies that illegit-
imately trample their values.
9 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/4/5/cognitive-illiberalism-expressive-overdeterm-
ination-a-fragme.html (comment by “dmk38”).
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